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Abstract We study adaptive security of delayed-input Sigma protocols
and non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems in the common
reference string (CRS) model. Our contributions are threefold:
– We exhibit a generic compiler taking any delayed-input Sigma pro-
tocol and returning a delayed-input Sigma protocol satisfying adaptive-
input special honest-verifier zero knowledge (SHVZK). In case the
initial Sigma protocol also satisfies adaptive-input special soundness,
our compiler preserves this property.
– We revisit the recent paradigm by Canetti et al. (STOC 2019) for
obtaining NIZK proof systems in the CRS model via the Fiat-Shamir
transform applied to so-called trapdoor Sigma protocols, in the con-
text of adaptive security. In particular, assuming correlation-intracta-
ble hash functions for all sparse relations, we prove that Fiat-Shamir
NIZKs satisfy either:
(i) Adaptive soundness (and non-adaptive zero knowledge), so long
as the challenge is obtained by hashing both the prover’s first
round and the instance being proven;
(ii) Adaptive zero knowledge (and non-adaptive soundness), so long
as the challenge is obtained by hashing only the prover’s first
round, and further assuming that the initial trapdoor Sigma
protocol satisfies adaptive-input SHVZK.
– We exhibit a generic compiler taking any Sigma protocol and return-
ing a trapdoor Sigma protocol. Unfortunately, this transform does not
preserve the delayed-input property of the initial Sigma protocol (if
any). To complement this result, we also give yet another compiler
taking any delayed-input trapdoor Sigma protocol and returning a
delayed-input trapdoor Sigma protocol with adaptive-input SHVZK.
An attractive feature of our first two compilers is that they allow obtain-
ing efficient delayed-input Sigma protocols with adaptive security, and
efficient Fiat-Shamir NIZKs with adaptive soundness (and non-adaptive
zero knowledge) in the CRS model. Prior to our work, the latter was
only possible using generic NP reductions.
Keywords: Sigma protocols · Non-interactive zero knowledge · Adapt-
ive security.
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1 Introduction
Sigma protocols are a special class of three-round public-coin interactive proofs
between a prover P and a verifier V, where P’s goal is to convince V that a com-
mon statement x belongs to a given NP language L. The prover knows a witness
w (corresponding to x) as auxiliary input, and starts the interaction by sending
a first message a (possibly depending on both x,w); the verifier then sends a
uniformly random `-bit challenge c, to which the prover replies with a last mes-
sage z. Finally, the verifier decides whether x ∈ L based on x and the transcript
(a, c, z). Despite completeness (i.e., the honest prover always convinces the hon-
est verifier about true statements), Sigma protocols satisfy two additional prop-
erties known as special soundness (SS) and special honest-verifier zero knowledge
(SHVZK). The former is a strong form of soundness (i.e., no malicious prover
can convince the verifier about the veracity of false statements x 6∈ L), which
in fact implies that Sigma protocols are proofs of knowledge [35, 6]; the latter
requires the existence of an efficient simulator S that, given any true statement
x ∈ L and any possible challenge c, is able to simulate an honest transcript
(a, c, z) between the prover and the verifier, which in particular implies that
honest transcripts do not reveal anything about the witness to the eyes of an
honest-but-curious verifier. While Sigma protocols exist for all of NP (as Blum’s
protocol [11] for Hamiltonian Graphs is a Sigma protocol), the latter comes at
the price of expensive NP reductions. Luckily, Sigma protocols also exist for
many concrete languages based on number theory and lattices (such as Quad-
ratic Residuosity [35], Discrete Log [50, 47], Factoring [33], and Learning with
Errors [51, 45, 2]), and these protocols are very efficient, thus opening the way
to a plethora of cryptographic applications, e.g. to constructing different kinds
of commitment schemes [28, 18, 39, 26, 44, 24] and trapdoor hash functions [7],
and for obtaining non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs and digital sig-
natures via the celebrated Fiat-Shamir transform [32, 8, 49]. In this paper we
study adaptive security for both Sigma protocols and Fiat-Shamir NIZKs.
Delayed-input Sigma Protocols. The classical Sigma protocol by Feige, Lap-
idot and Shamir [31, 43] for Graph Hamiltonicity (henceforth denoted by FLS)
has the special property that the prover can compute the first round of the proof
without knowing the graph, so long as it knows the number of vertices ahead
of time. In particular, the graph and the corresponding Hamiltonian cycle are
only needed to compute the prover’s last round. More generally, a Sigma pro-
tocol is called delayed-input if the prover’s first round can be computed given
only n = |x| (and without knowing x,w). For such Sigma protocols, the stand-
ard definitions of SS and SHVZK may not be sufficient as they do not take
into account attackers choosing the statement x adaptively based on a partial
transcript (a, c). This limitation may have a negative impact4 on the applica-
tions of delayed-input Sigma protocols, particularly in settings where adaptive
4 We discuss practical applications where adaptive security is of concern in Section 1.3.
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security is required. While, the FLS protocol already satisfies both adaptive-
input SS and adaptive-input SHVZK,5 the latter is only of theoretical interest.
Partially motivated by this shortcoming, Ciampi et al. [23] proposed a general
transformation for turning any delayed-input Sigma protocol into one satisfying
adaptive-input SS. This leaves the following open problem. Q1: “Do there ex-
ist efficient delayed-input Sigma protocols with adaptive security (i.e., satisfying
both adaptive-input SS and adaptive-input SHVZK)?”
Fiat-Shamir NIZKs. The Fiat-Shamir tranform [32] allows to turn a Sigma
protocol into a non-interactive proof system by means of a hash functions h
with `-bit output. The idea is for the prover to compute a and z as prescribed
by the Sigma protocol, where the challenge c is set to c := h(a||x). One can
show that this yields a secure NIZK starting from any Sigma protocol, so long
as the hash function h is modelled as a random oracle [8, 30]. Whether security
of the Fiat-Shamir transform can be proven without resorting to random oracles
has been a question subject of intensive study. Here, the goal is to instantiate
the random oracle with a set of efficiently computable hash functions H = {hk},
where the hash key k is made available to all parties in the form of a com-
mon reference string (CRS). Unfortunately, several negative results are known
in this respect [29, 4, 34, 10], which, however, only exclude the possibility of
instantiating the Fiat-Shamir transform starting with any Sigma protocol or via
black-box reductions to falsifiable assumptions. Indeed, a recent line of research6
established the above negative results can be circumvented:
– Assuming the initial interactive protocol is a trapdoor Sigma protocols [14].
Informally, a trapdoor Sigma protocol is a special Sigma protocol in the CRS
model satisfying the following two properties: (i) If the statement x is false,
then for every first message a, there is a unique challenge c for which there is
an accepting third message z that results in an accepting transcript (a, c, z);
(ii) There is a trapdoor associated with the CRS that allows us to efficiently
compute this “bad challenge” c from the first message a and the statement
x being proven.
– Assuming thatH is a family of correlation-intractable (CI) hash functions [17].
Informally, a family H satisfies CI w.r.t. some relation R if no efficient at-
tacker given the hash key k can produce an input x such that (x, hk(x)) ∈ R.
CI hash functions w.r.t. broad-enough7 relations have recently been construc-
ted from a variety of assumptions including program obfuscation [15, 46, 41],
strong one-way functions [40], key-dependent message secure encryption [16],
5 Intuitively, adaptive-input SS guarantees extraction even for transcripts (a, c, z) and
(a, c′, z′) for different (possibly adaptively chosen) statements. Similarly, adaptive-
input SHVZK requires the simulator to fake the prover’s first message given only
n = |x|.
6 This research extends previous results showing that CI is sufficient for proving sound-
ness of the Fiat-Shamir transform [29, 5, 38].
7 In particular, sufficient for proving security of Fiat-Shamir NIZKs without random
oracles.
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circularly-secure fully-homomorphic encryption [14], LWE [48], and LPN
along with DDH/QR/DCR/LWE [13].
A natural question is whether Fiat-Shamir NIZKs obtained via CI hash func-
tions are adaptively secure, i.e. whether the non-interactive proof resulting from
applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to a trapdoor Sigma protocol satisfies both
adaptive soundness and adaptive zero-knowledge in the CRS model.8 Canetti et
al. [14] proved that a slight variant of the FLS protocol directly achieves adaptive
security, however, in order to be used in applications, the latter requires expens-
ive NP reductions, and thus results in very inefficient NIZKs. They also provide
an efficient instantiation using the classical Sigma protocol for Quadratic Residu-
osity [35], and more in general starting with any instance-dependent trapdoor
Sigma protocol (in which the trapdoor is allowed to depend on the statement
being proven). Unfortunately, instance-dependent trapdoor Sigma protocols are
not sufficient to prove adaptive security of Fiat-Shamir NIZKs, thus leaving
the following intriguing open question. Q2: “Do there exist efficient trapdoor
Sigma protocols allowing to obtain Fiat-Shamir NIZKs with adaptive security
(i.e., satisfying both adaptive soundness and adaptive zero knowledge in the CRS
model)?”
1.1 Our Contributions
In this work, we make progress towards answering the above two open questions
in the affirmative. Our first contribution is a general compiler taking any delayed-
input Sigma protocol and outputting another delayed-input Sigma protocol (for
the same language) with adaptive-input SHVZK. Furthermore, assuming the
initial Sigma protocol already satisfies adaptive-input SS, so does the Sigma
protocol produced by our compiler. Hence, using the transformation by Ciampi
et al. [23], we obtain a general compiler which allows to turn any delayed-input
Sigma protocol into one with adaptive security, which is a positive answer to
Q1. Next, we revisit the framework for obtaining adaptively-secure NIZKs via
the Fiat-Shamir transform using CI hash functions. In particular, we show the
following two results:
– In case the challenge c is obtained by hashing both the prover’s first round
a and the statement x (i.e., c = hk(a||x)), trapdoor Sigma protocols are
sufficient for proving adaptive soundness and non-adaptive zero knowledge of
Fiat-Shamir NIZKs in the CRS model.
– In case the challenge c is obtained by hashing only the prover’s first round
a (i.e., c = hk(a)), trapdoor Sigma protocols satisfying soundness (which
in turn follows by SS) and adaptive-input SHVZK are sufficient for proving
non-adaptive soundness and adaptive zero knowledge of Fiat-Shamir NIZKs
in the CRS model.
8 The former means that no malicious prover, given the CRS, can produce a false
statement along with an accepting non-interactive proof. The latter means that no
malicious verifier, given the CRS, can produce a true statement, along with the
corresponding witness, for which a non-interactive proof cannot be simulated in
polynomial time given the statement alone.
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The fact that hashing both the prover’s first message and the statement is essen-
tial for obtaining adaptive soundness was already known for the random oracle
model [9]. In this vein, our paper confirms this to be sufficient in the plain model
as well. Our second contribution is a compiler taking any Sigma protocol and
outputting a trapdoor Sigma protocol (for the same language). Unfortunately,
this compiler does not preserve the delayed-input property of the initial Sigma
protocol (if any), and thus, by our result from above, only implies Fiat-Shamir
NIZKs with adaptive soundness (but not adaptive zero knowledge). This res-
ult can still be interpreted as a partial (positive) answer to Q2, as it allows to
obtain efficient Fiat-Shamir NIZKs with adaptive soundness (and non-adaptive
zero knowledge) in the CRS model for any language admitting a Sigma protocol.
Previously to our work, the latter was possible only using expensive NP reduc-
tions. Finally, we also show that any delayed-input trapdoor Sigma protocol can
be turned into a delayed-input trapdoor Sigma protocol with adaptive-input
SHVZK, which (again by our generalization of [14]) would be sufficient for ob-
taining Fiat-Shamir NIZKs with adaptive zero knowledge (and non-adaptive
soundness) in the CRS model. Unfortunately, the only example we know of a
delayed-input trapdoor Sigma protocol is FLS (for which [14] directly proved ad-
aptive security of the corresponding Fiat-Shamir NIZK), and thus we view this
more as a conceptual contribution providing a possible path towards obtaining
efficient Fiat-Shamir NIZKs with adaptive zero knowledge in the future.
1.2 Technical Overview
Adaptive-input SHVZK. Our first compiler exploits so-called instance-depen-
dent trapdoor commitment (IDTC) schemes. Intuitively, this primitive is para-
meterized by an NP language L and allows a sender to create a commitment com
(with opening dec) to a message m using a statement x as a label. The main
idea is that: (i) In case x 6∈ L is a false statement, the commitment satisfies the
standard binding property. (ii) In case x ∈ L is a true statement, the commitment
satisfies the standard hiding property and additionally, given a valid witness w
for x, one can generate a fake commitment com that is distributed like an hon-
est commitment but that can later be opened to any message (the so-called
trapdoorness property). It is well known that IDTCs for any language L can be
constructed in a black-box way given any Sigma protocol for L [27, 26, 44, 24].
We now explain how to compile any delayed-input Sigma protocol Σ for a
language L into a delayed-input Sigma protocol Σ′′ for L that satisfies adaptive-
input SHVZK. The transformation relies on an IDTC Π for the language LDH
of Diffie-Hellman (DH) tuples, and on a Sigma protocol Σ′ for the complement
language LDH of non-DH tuples.
9
– The prover, given only x ∈ L, starts by sampling a random non-DH tuple
T ∈ LDH , along with the corresponding witness, and then computes a com-
mitment com (with decommitment dec) to the first round a of Σ using T as
9 We refer the reader to the full version for a description of Σ′.
6 M. Ciampi et al.
label. Next, it computes the first round a′ of Σ′ and forwards (com, a′, T ) to
the verifier.
– The verifier sends a random `-bit challenge c to the prover.
– Upon receiving a valid witness w for x, the prover computes the third round
z and z′ of both Σ and Σ′, and forwards them to the verifier along with the
opening (a, dec) of commitment com.
The proof of (adaptive-input) SS of Σ′′ follows readily from the (adaptive-
input) SS of Σ and the binding property of Π. Hence, we here focus on the proof
of adaptive-input SHVZK. The simulator proceeds as follows:
– Upon receiving challenge c ∈ {0, 1}`, the simulator first samples a random
DH tuple T ∈ LDH and generates a fake commitment com using T and
its corresponding witness. Next, it runs the SHVZK simulator of Σ′ upon
input T and c obtaining (a′, z′) and returns a simulated first round a′′ =
(com, a′, T ).
– Upon receiving statement x ∈ L, the simulator runs the SHVZK simulator
of Σ upon input x and c obtaining (a, z). Hence, it opens the commitment
com to a obtaining decommitment dec, and returns a simulated third round
z′′ = (z, z′, (a, dec)).
In the proof, we first move to a mental experiment with a modified simulator
that generates (a, z) using the real prover of Σ; this is possible thanks to the
SHVZK property of Σ. Next, we replace T ∈ LDH with T ∈ LDH and (com, dec)
with an honestly computed commitment to a. The DDH assumption and the
trapdoorness property of Π imply that no efficient distinguisher can notice such
a change. Finally, we use the SHVZK property of Σ′ to compute (a′, z′) as the
real prover of Σ′ would do, which yields exactly the same distribution of proofs
as generated by our compiler, and thus concludes the proof. Note that, besides
running Σ, our transformation requires to run an IDTC in parallel with Σ′ (to
prove that a tuple is DH). The cost of running the IDTC corresponds to running
a Sigma protocol for DH tuples. The cost of running a Sigma protocol that proves
that a tuple is DH is of 2 exponentiations for the prover and 4 exponentiations
for the verifier. Therefore, our compiler adds an overhead of 4 exponentiations
for the prover and 8 exponentiations for the verifier.
Adaptive Security of Fiat-Shamir NIZKs. We start by recalling the no-
tion of trapdoor Sigma protocols in more details. Intuitively, a trapdoor Sigma
protocol is a special kind of three-round public-coin proof system in the CRS
model10 with the guarantee that, for every valid CRS ω, every false statement
x /∈ L, and every first round a, there is at most one challenge c := f(ω, a, x)
such that, for some z, the transcript (a, c, z) is accepting w.r.t. (ω, x). The func-
tion f is called the bad-challenge function. Moreover, it is possible to generate
an honest-looking CRS ω along with a trapdoor τ which allows to efficiently
compute the bad challenge c given the first round a and the statement x.
10 The latter means that, at setup, a CRS ω is generated and distributed to both the
prover and the verifier.
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Let Σ be a trapdoor Sigma protocol for language L, and Π be the non-
interactive proof derived from Σ via the Fiat-Shamir transform using a CI hash
family H for all “efficiently searchable” sparse relations. The proof of adaptive
security of Π follows closely the approached used in [14], with a few crucial
differences. In particular:
– To show adaptive soundness, one first argues that any prover which, given
an honestly-computed CRS (ω, k), is able to produce a statement x 6∈ L and
a non-interactive proof π = (a, z) such that (a, c, z) is accepting w.r.t. (ω, x)
for c = hk(a||x) with non-negligible probability, must do so even in case
the CRS ω of Σ is generated along with the trapdoor τ . The latter, how-
ever, contradicts the CI property of the hash family H w.r.t. the (efficiently
searchable) relation Rω,τ := {(a||x, c) : x 6∈ L ∧ c = f(τ, ω, a, x)}, which
is easily seen to be sparse thanks to the soundness property of Σ. The key
observation that allows to prove adaptive security here is the fact that the
hash function takes also x as input, which allows the reduction to CI to go
through without knowing x in advance.
– The simulator for adaptive zero knowledge picks a random challenge c and
then obtains a invoking the adaptive-input SHVZK simulator of Σ. Hence,
it samples a fresh CRS ω and a random hash key k from the conditional dis-
tribution hk(a) = c, yielding a simulated CRS (ω, k). Finally, upon receiving
x ∈ L from the adversary, it obtains z from the adaptive-input SHVZK
simulator and outputs a simulated proof π = (a, z). We note that for this
to work it is essential that the challenge c is obtained by hashing only the
prover’s first message a, as otherwise the simulator would not be able to
sample k uniformly from the conditional distribution c = hk(a||x) without
being given x in advance.
From Sigma protocols to trapdoor Sigma protocols. Let us now explain our com-
piler for turning any Sigma protocol Σ into a trapdoor Sigma protocol Σ′. The
CRS ω′ of Σ′ consists of the CRS ω of Σ (if any), along with the public key
pk of a (committing) public-key encryption (PKE) scheme. For simplicity, let
us assume that the challenge space of Σ is {0, 1}; it is immediate to extend
the challenge space arbitrarily using parallel repetition. The prover of Σ′ simply
obtains a by running the prover of Σ. Hence, it computes both answers z0 and
z1 corresponding to the two possible challenges c = 0 and c = 1, and it encrypts
z0 and z1 under pk obtaining two ciphertexts e0, e1. The prover’s first message
consists of a′ = (a, e0, e1). Finally, upon receiving a challenge c, the prover’s last
message z′ consists of the response zc along with the random coins rc used to
obtain ec. The verifier accepts if and only if (a, c, zc) is a valid transcript w.r.t.
(ω, x), and additionally (zc, rc) is consistent with ec. It is not hard to show that
the above transformation preserves both SS and SHVZK of the underlying pro-
tocol Σ, so long as the PKE scheme is semantically secure. To prove that Σ′
is a trapdoor Sigma protocol it remains to show how to efficiently compute the
bad-challenge function. The main idea here is to let the secret key sk corres-
ponding to pk be the trapdoor τ . This way, given a′ and x, we can decrypt e0, e1
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obtaining11 the responses z0, z1. Note that in case both transcripts (a, 0, z0) and
(a, 1, z1) are accepting w.r.t. (ω, x), the SS property of Σ implies that x ∈ L.
On the other hand, if x 6∈ L, there exists at most one challenge c such that
(a, c, zc) is accepting, and we can determine c efficiently by simply running the
verifier algorithm upon input both transcripts (a, 0, z0) and (a,1 , z1). Note that,
besides running Σ, our transformation requires to encrypt two values using a
public-key encryption scheme. Moreover, if we want a trapdoor Sigma protocol
with challenge space {0, 1}` for some ` ∈ N, and consequently better soundness,
we need to repeat our protocol in parallel ` times. If the cost of running Σ is CP
for the prover and CV for the verifier, and the cost of computing an encryption
is CE , then the cost of running our protocol for the prover is (CP + 2CE)` and
for the verifier is (CV + CE)`.
Adding adaptive-input SHVZK. Note that Σ′ as defined above is inherently not
delayed-input, even assuming Σ is delayed-input. This is because the prover
needs the witness in order to compute the two possible responses z0, z1 already
in the first round. Our last compiler overcomes this problem by extending our
very first transform (for obtaining delayed-input Sigma protocols with adaptive-
input SHVZK) to trapdoor Sigma protocols. The main idea is to work in the
CRS model and replace the IDTC with an extractable IDTC (a new notion that
we introduce). Intuitively, the difference between IDTCs and extractable IDTCs
is that the latter are defined in the CRS model, and the CRS can be generated
together with a trapdoor in such a way that, given a commitment of the ex-
tractable IDTC scheme with respect to a false instance, it is possible to extract
the committed value (which is unique) using the trapdoor. Moreover, the com-
mitment procedure now outputs a message com and an instance T such that the
verifier can check if the first two components of T are consistent with the CRS.
As we show, the latter allows to preserve the trapdoorness property of Σ when
applying the transformation described before, while at the same time boosting
SHVZK to adaptive-input SHVZK. Finally, we give a simple construction of an
extractable IDTC Π for the language LDH of DH tuples. This construction is
based on the observation that the classical Sigma protocol for DH tuples has a
special extractor which, on input the first round a = (gr, hr
′
) and γ such that
h = gγ , outputs the only possible challenge c that would make the transcript
(a, c, z) accepting w.r.t. a non-DH tuple (for some z). Given a Sigma protocol Σ
for LDH , we then show how to obtain an extractable IDTC. The main idea is to
set the CRS to (g, h = gγ) and the trapdoor to τ = γ. Each commitment com
is then equipped with a value T = (gα, hβ) with α 6= β. Note that in this case
(ω, T ) corresponds to a non-DH tuple, hence the extractor can be run on com,
which corresponds to the first round of Σ.
1.3 Applications
Our results directly allow to achieve adaptive security of delayed-input Sigma
protocols and Fiat-Shamir NIZKs. Since applications of the latter are well known,
11 Due to the committing property of the PKE scheme.
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below we elaborate on the impact of our results on applications of the former.
The delayed-input property directly improves the round complexity of any cryp-
tographic protocol consisting of the following two steps: (1) an NP-statement x
and a witness w is defined via an interactive process; and (2) one of the parties
involved in the protocol provides a proof that x is a true statement. Indeed, using
a delayed-input Sigma protocol that allows proving the validity of x, it is possible
to parallelize the above two steps, thus decreasing the round complexity of the
overall process. Furthermore, the delayed-input property of FLS has proven to
be particularly powerful for providing round-efficient constructions from general
assumptions, such as: 4-round (optimal) secure 2PC where only one player gets
the output (5 rounds when both players get the output) [42], 4-round 2PC in the
simultaneous message exchange model where both parties get the output [22],
4-round MPC for any functionality [19, 3, 1, 12], 3-round non-malleable com-
mitments [20, 36] and 4-round non-malleable commitments [21, 37]. In many
cryptographic applications, one party needs to prove an OR statement of the
form “either x is true or I know a trapdoor”, where neither x nor the trapdoor
might be known at the beginning of the protocol. Our adaptive-input SHVZK
Sigma protocols can be used to prove exactly this kind of statements, as we
can combine adaptive-input (and non-adaptive-input) SHVZK Sigma protocols
using the well-known OR composition technique of [25], which yields an adapt-
ive witness-indistinguishable (WI) Sigma protocol (i.e., a Sigma protocol that
retains the WI property even when the statement is adaptively chosen after the
first round). The notion of adaptive WI was formalized in [23], where the au-
thors proposed a general compiler to obtain this property. The advantage of our
approach is that we obtain a more efficient compiler. Indeed, the compiler of [23]
requires to compute at least one additional commitment for each statement that
composes the OR theorem.
2 Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with the notions of negligible functions, computational
indistinguishability, and public-key encryption. We refer to the full version for
additional standard definitions. We start the section by introducing our notation.
For a string x, we denote its length by |x|; if S is a set, |S| represents the number
of elements in S. When x is chosen randomly in S, we write x←$ S. When A
is a randomized algorithm, we write y←$A(x) to denote a run of A on input x
(and implicit random coins r) and output y; the value y is a random variable,
and A(x; r) denotes a run of A on input x and randomness r. An algorithm
A is probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if A is randomized and for any input
x, r ∈ {0, 1}∗ the computation of A(x; r) terminates in a polynomial number
of steps (in the size of the input). A polynomial-time relation R is a relation
for which membership of (x,w) w.r.t. R can be decided in time polynomial in
|x|. If (x,w) ∈ R then we say that w is a witness for instance x. A polynomial-
time relation R is naturally associated with the NP language LR defined as
LR = {x : ∃w s.t. (x,w) ∈ R}. (When R is clear from the context, we simply
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write L.) Similarly, an NP language is naturally associated with a polynomial-
time relation. We denote by L̂R the language such that LR ⊆ L̂R and membership
in L̂R may be tested in polynomial time.
Sigma Protocols. Let L be an NP language, with corresponding relation R. A
Sigma protocol Σ = (P,V) for R is a 3-round public-coin protocol. In particular,
an execution of Σ proceeds as follows:
– The prover P computes the first message using as input the instance to
be proved x ∈ L with the corresponding witness w, and outputs the first
message a with an auxiliary information st ; we denote this action with
(a, st)←$ P(x,w).
– The verifier V, upon receiving a, sends a random string c←$ {0, 1}` with
` ∈ N.
– The prover P, upon input c and st , computes and sends z to V; we denote
this action with z←$ P(st , c).
– The verifier V, upon input (x, a, c, z), outputs 1 to accept and 0 to reject; we
denote this action with V(x, a, c, z) = d where d ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether V
accepts or not.
Definition 1 (Sigma protocol [25]). A 3-move protocol Σ with challenge
length ` ∈ N is a Sigma protocol for a relation R if it enjoys the following
properties:
– Completeness. If (x,w) ∈ R, then all honest 3-move transcripts for (x,w)
are accepting.
– Special soundness. There exists an efficient algorithm K that, on input
two accepting transcripts (a, c, z) and (a, c′, z′) for x with c′ 6= c (we refer to
such two accepting transcripts as a collision) outputs a witness w such that
(x,w) ∈ R.
– Special honest-verifier zero knowledge (SHVZK). There exists a PPT
simulator algorithm S that takes as input security parameter 1λ, x ∈ L
and c ∈ {0, 1}`, and outputs an accepting transcript for x where c is the
challenge (we denote this action with (a, z)←$ S(x, c)). Moreover, for all `-
bit strings c, the distribution of the output of the simulator on input (x, c) is
computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of the 3-move honest
transcript obtained when V sends c as challenge and P runs on common
input x and any private input w such that (x,w) ∈ R.
The DDH Assumption. We give a high level overview on the DDH assump-
tion and its variants. We refer the reader to the full version for a more formal
and complete treatment. Let G be a cyclic group with generator g, and let A,B
and X be elements of G. We say that (g,A,B,X) is a Diffie-Hellman tuple (a
DH tuple, in short) if A = gα, B = gβ for some integers 0 ≤ α, β ≤ |G| − 1, and
X = gαβ . If this is not the case, (g,A,B,X) is called a non-DH tuple.
The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption posits the hardness of dis-
tinguishing a randomly selected DH tuple from a randomly selected non-DH
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tuple. Consider now the polynomial-time relation R1nDH := {((g,A,B,X), α) :
A = gα and X = g · Bα}. A 1-non-DH tuple is a tuple T = (g,A,B,X) such
that A = gα, B = gβ and X = g · Bα = gα·β+1. Under the DDH assumption
random 1-non-DH tuples are indistinguishable from random non-DH tuple. As
showed in [23], a Sigma protocol Σ1nDH for the relation R1nDH can be construc-
ted based on the Sigma protocol ΣDH of [25] to prove that a given tuple is DH.
The compiler of [23] is almost as efficient as ΣDH and works as follows. On input
tuples (g,A,B,X), the prover and the verifier construct tuples (g,A,B, Y ) by
setting Y = X/g. Then, they simply run Sigma protocol ΣDH upon input the
theorem (g,A,B, Y ).
2.1 Instance-Dependent Trapdoor Commitment
An instance-dependent trapdoor commitment scheme for polynomial-time rela-
tion R with message space M is a quadruple of PPT algorithms (Com,Dec,Fake1,
Fake2) specified as follows:
– Com is the randomized commitment algorithm that takes as input an in-
stance x ∈ L̂ and a message m ∈ M , and outputs commitment com and
decommitment dec;
– Dec is the verification algorithm that takes as input x ∈ L̂, com, dec and
m ∈M , and decides whether m is the decommitment of com;
– Fake1 takes as input (x,w) ∈ R and outputs commitment com, and equivoc-
ation information rand;
– Fake2 takes as input (x,w) ∈ R, message m ∈ M , and (com, rand), and
outputs dec;
Definition 2 (Instance-dependent trapdoor commitment scheme). Let
R be a polynomial-time relation. We call Π = (Com,Dec,Fake1,Fake2) an instance-
dependent trapdoor commitment scheme (an IDTC, in short) for R if it enjoys
the following properties:
– Correctness. For all x ∈ L̂, and all m ∈M , it holds that
P [Dec(x, com, dec,m) = 1 : (com, dec)←$ Com(x,m)] = 1.
– Binding. For all x /∈ L, and for every commitment com, there exists at
most one message m ∈M for which there is a valid decommitment dec (i.e.
Dec(x, com, dec,m) = 1).
– Hiding. For every x ∈ L, and every m0,m1 ∈M , the two ensembles {com :
(com, dec)←$ Com(1λ, x,m0)}λ∈N and {com : (com, dec)←$ Com(1λ, x,m1)}λ∈N
are identically distributed.
– Trapdoorness. For all (x,w) ∈ R and m ∈ M the following two distribu-
tions coincide:
{(com, dec) : (com, rand)←$ Fake1(x,w); dec←$ Fake2(x,w,m, com, rand)}
{(com, dec) : (com, dec)← Com(x,m)} .
An IDTC can be easily constructed from any Sigma protocol as shown in [26,
39, 28, 23].
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2.2 Correlation-Intractable Hash Families
Definition 3 (Hash family). For a pair of efficiently computable functions
(n(·),m(·)), a hash family with input length n and output length m is a collection
H = {hk : {0, 1}n(λ) → {0, 1}m(λ)}λ∈N,k∈{0,1}s(λ) of keyed hash functions, along
with a pair of PPT algorithms specified as follows: (i) H.Gen(1λ) outputs a hash
key k ∈ {0, 1}s(λ); (ii) H.Hash(k, x) computes the function hk(x).
Definition 4 (Correlation intractability). For a given relation ensemble
R := {Rλ ⊆ {0, 1}n(λ) × {0, 1}m(λ)}, a hash family H = {hk : {0, 1}n(λ) →
{0, 1}m(λ)}λ∈N,k∈{0,1}s(λ) is said to be R-correlation intractable with security
(σ, δ) if for every σ-size attacker A := {Aλ}:
P
[
(x, hk(x)) ∈ Rλ : k←$H.Gen(1λ);x←$A(k)
]
= O(δ(λ)).
We say that H is R-correlation intractable if it is R-correlation intractable
with security (λc, λ−c) for all constants c > 1.
Correlation intractability is a useful and versatile property of random oracles
that we would like to guarantee in the standard model. However, even a random
oracle is only R-correlation intractable for so-called sparse relations.
Definition 5 (Sparsity). For any relation ensemble R := {Rλ ⊆ {0, 1}n(λ) ×
{0, 1}m(λ)}λ, we say that R is ρ(·)-sparse if for all λ ∈ N and for any x ∈
{0, 1}n(λ) it holds that (x, y) ∈ Rλ with probability at most ρ(λ) over the choice
of y←$ {0, 1}m(λ). When ρ is a negligible function, we say that R is sparse.
Efficiently Searchable Relations. In this work, we will need hash families achiev-
ing correlation intractability for relations R with a unique output y = f(x)
associated to each input x, and such that y = f(x) is an efficiently computable
function of x.
Definition 6 (Unique output relation). We say that a relation R is a unique
output relation if for every input x, there exists at most one output y such that
(x, y) ∈ R.
Definition 7 (Efficiently searchable relation). We say that a (necessarily
unique-output) relation ensemble R is searchable in (non-uniform) time t if there
exists a function f = fR : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ computable in (non-uniform) time t
such that for any input x, if (x, y) ∈ R then y = f(x); that is, f(x) is the unique
y such that (x, y) ∈ R, provided that such a y exists. We say that R is efficiently
searchable if it is searchable in time poly(n).
Programmability. The following property turns out to be very useful in order
to prove the zero-knowledge property of non-interactive proofs derived using
correlation-intractable hash families.
Definition 8 (1-universality). We say that a hash family H is 1-universal
if for any λ ∈ N, input x ∈ {0, 1}n(λ), and output y ∈ {0, 1}m(λ), we have
P
[
hk(x) = y : k←$H.Gen(1λ)
]
= 2−m(λ).
We say that a hash family H is programmable if it is 1-universal, and if
there exists an efficient sampling algorithm Sample(1λ, x, y) that samples from
the conditional distribution k←$H.Gen(1λ)|hk(x) = y.
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2.3 Non-Interactive Argument Systems
Definition 9 (NIZK argument systems). A non-interactive zero-knowledge
argument system (NIZK) for an NP-language L consists of three PPT machines
Π := (Gen,P,V), that have the following properties:
– Completeness. For all λ ∈ N, and all (x,w) ∈ R, it holds that:
P
[
V(ω, x,P(ω, x, w)) = 1 : ω←$ Gen(1λ, 1|x|)
]
= 1.
– Soundness. For all PPT provers P∗, there exists a negligible function ν :
N→ [0, 1], such that for all λ ∈ N and for all x /∈ L:
P
[
V(ω, x, π) = 1 : ω←$ Gen(1λ, 1|x|);π←$ P∗(ω)
]
≤ ν(λ).
– Zero knowledge. There exists a PPT simulator S such that for every
(x,w) ∈ R, the distribution ensembles {(ω, π) : ω←$ Gen(1λ, 1|x|);π←$ P(ω,
x, w)}λ∈N and {S(1λ, x)}λ∈N are computationally indistinguishable.
A NIZK argument system can also satisfy various stronger properties. We list
them below.
– Adaptive zero knowledge. For all PPT verifiers V∗ there exists a PPT
simulator S := (S0,S1) such that the following distribution ensembles are
computationally indistinguishable:
{(ω, π) : ω←$ Gen(1λ, 1|x|); (x,w)←$ V∗(ω);π←$ P(ω, x, w); (x,w) ∈ R}λ∈N
{(ω, π) : (ω, τ)←$ S0(1λ, 1|x|); (x,w)←$ V∗(ω);π←$ S1(ω, τ, x); (x,w) ∈ R}λ∈N
– Adaptive soundness. For all PPT prover P∗, there exists a negligible func-
tion ν : N→ [0, 1], such that for all λ ∈ N:
P
[
V(ω, x, π) = 1 : ω←$ Gen(1λ, 1|x|); (x, π)←$ P∗(ω);x /∈ L
]
≤ ν(λ).
3 A Compiler for Adaptive-input HVZK
Definition 10 (Delayed-input protocols [23]). A delayed-input three-move
protocol for polynomial-time relation R is a three-move protocol (P,V) in which
the first message of P can be computed on input the length n of the common
theorem in unary notation.12
Definition 11 (Adaptive-input special soundness). A delayed-input 3-round
protocol Σ = (P,V) for relation R enjoys adaptive-input special soundness if
there exists a polynomial-time algorithm K such that, for any x1, x2 ∈ L, and
for any pair of accepting transcripts (a, c1, z1) for input x1 and (a, c2, z2) for
input x2 with c1 6= c2, outputs witnesses w1 and w2 such that (x1, w1) ∈ R and
(x2, w2) ∈ R.
Definition 12 (Adaptive-input SHVZK). A delayed-input 3-round protocol
Σ = (P,V) for relation R satisfies adaptive-input special honest-verifier zero-
knowledge (adaptive-input SHVZK) if there exists a PPT simulator algorithm
S = (S0,S1) such that for all PPT adversaries A and for all challenges c ∈
{0, 1}` there is a negligible function ν : N → [0, 1] for which
∣∣P [b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣ ≤
ν(λ) in the following game:
12 For simplicity, in what follows, we sometimes drop input 1n when describing the
prover of a delayed-input Sigma protocol.
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1. The challenger sends (a, c) to A, where the value a is either computed using
(a, st)←$ P(1λ, 1n) (in case b = 0) or (a, st)←$ S0(1λ, 1n, c) (in case b = 1).
2. The adversary A sends a pair (x,w) to the challenger, where |x| = n. Hence,
if (x,w) ∈ R, the challenger sends z to A, where the value z is either com-
puted using z←$ P(x,w, st , c) (in case b = 0) or z←$ S1(x, st) (in case
b = 1); Else, the challenger sends z = ⊥ to A.
3. The adversary A outputs a bit b′.
The Transformation. It turns out that the celebrated Sigma protocol by
Lapidot and Shamir [43] is already delayed-input, and moreover it satisfies both
adaptive-input special soundness13 and adaptive-input SHVZK. While this pro-
tocol works for any NP relation, it is very inefficient as it requires generic NP
reductions. Hence, it is a natural question whether there are efficient Sigma
protocols that are delayed-input and satisfy both adaptive-input special sound-
ness and SHVZK. A partial answer to this question was given in [23], which
shows how to transform a large class of delayed-input Sigma protocols into
ones with adaptive-input special soundness. In this section, we give yet another
transform that allows to turn any delayed-input Sigma protocol into one sat-
isfying adaptive-input SHVZK. Moreover, assuming the initial Sigma protocol
already satisfies adaptive-input special soundness, our transformation preserves
this property. Let Σ be a delayed-input Sigma protocol for a polynomial-time
relation R. We construct a Sigma protocol Σ′′ for R based on the following
additional building blocks: (i) An IDTC Π = (Com,Dec,Fake1,Fake2) for the
relation RDH (see §2); and (ii) A Sigma protocol Σ′ = (P ′,V ′) for the relation
R1nDH (see §2). Intuitively, the prover starts by computing the first round a of
the Sigma protocol Σ. Hence, it commits to message a using the IDTC with
a random 1-non-DH tuple T ∈ L1nDH as instance (i.e., A = gα, B = gβ and
C = g · Bα = gα·β+1 for random α, β ∈ Zq)), obtaining a commitment com and
decommitment dec. Next, the prover computes the first round a′ of the Sigma
protocol Σ′ for showing that T is indeed a 1-non-DH tuple, and sends (com, a′, T )
to the verifier, which replies with a random challenge c ∈ {0, 1}`. Finally, the
prover completes the transcripts of both Σ and Σ′ using c as challenge, obtaining
values z, z′ that are forwarded to the verifier together with the decommitment
information (dec, a) corresponding to commitment com. In the full version we
formally prove that the above construction yields to a delayed-input Sigma pro-
tocol for R satisfying both adaptive-input special soundness and adaptive-input
SHVZK.
4 Adaptive Security of the Fiat-Shamir Transform
Trapdoor Sigma Protocols. Informally, a trapdoor Sigma protocol is a special
Sigma protocol in the CRS model satisfying the following two properties: (i) If
13 Strictly speaking, [43] only achieves a weaker flavor of adaptive-input special sound-
ness that allows to extract the witness for only one of the two theorems.
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the statement x is false, then for every first message a, there is a unique challenge
c for which there is an accepting third message z that results in an accepting
transcript (a, c, z); (ii) There is a trapdoor associated with the CRS that allows
us to efficiently compute this “bad challenge” c from the first message a and
the statement x being proven. We now slightly revisit the definition of trapdoor
Sigma protocols from [14], and show that the Fiat-Shamir transform applied to a
trapdoor Sigma protocol (where the hash function takes as input both the state-
ment and the first round of the prover) yields a NIZK with adaptive soundness.
The only difference between the definition in [14] and ours is that we require
the honestly generated CRS to be identically distributed to the CRS generated
together with the trapdoor.14 We also show that, assuming the trapdoor Sigma
protocol admits an adaptive-input SHVZK simulator, then the NIZK resulting
from the FS transform (where the hash function now takes as input only the
first round of the prover) satisfies adaptive zero knowledge.
Definition 13 (CRSigma protocols). We say that a three-round public-coin
SHVZK proof system Σ = (Gen,P,V)15 in the CRS model is a CRSigma pro-
tocol if for every valid CRS ω, every instance x /∈ L, and every first round a,
there is at most one challenge c := f(ω, x, a) such that (ω, x, a, c, z) is an ac-
cepting transcript for some z. We informally call f the “bad-challenge function”
associated to Σ, and note that f may not be efficiently computable.16
Definition 14 (Trapdoor Sigma protocol). We say that a CRSigma protocol
Σ = (Gen,P,V) with bad-challenge function f is a trapdoor Sigma protocol if
there are PPT algorithms TrapGen, BadChallenge with the following syntax:
– TrapGen takes as input the unary representation of the security parameter
and outputs a common reference string ω with a trapdoor τ .
– BadChallenge takes as input a trapdoor τ , common reference string ω, an
instance x and the first message a and outputs a challenge c.
We additionally require the following properties.
– CRS indistinguishability. An honestly generated common reference string
ω is identically distributed to a common reference string output by TrapGen(1λ).
– Correctness. For every instance x /∈ L and for all (ω, τ)←$ TrapGen(1λ)
we have that BadChallenge(τ, ω, x, a) = f(ω, x, a).
The Fiat-Shamir transform. Let H be a hash family and Σ = (Gen,P,V) be a
(delayed-input) CRSigma protocol for some relation R. Consider the following
non-interactive argument systems Π ′ = (Gen′,P ′,V ′) and Π ′′ = (Gen′,P ′′,V ′)
for R:
– The common reference string ω′ := (ω, k) consists of the common reference
string of Σ (i.e., ω←$ Gen(1λ)) along with a hash key k←$H.Gen(1λ).
14 This modification is related to the fact that we want to prove adaptive soundness
(more on this later).
15 In this case the SHVZK simulator computes also the CRS.
16 We observe that this notion implies that a trapdoor Sigma protocol is sound with
soundness error 2−|c|.
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– Upon input (x,w) ∈ R, the prover P ′ (resp. P ′′) computes (a, st)←$ P(1λ, ω,
x, w) (resp. (a, st)←$ P(1λ, ω)), c := hk(a||x) (resp. c := hk(a)) and z←$
P(st , c) (resp. z←$ P(st , x, w, c)), and outputs17 (a, c, z).
– The verifier V ′ (resp. V ′′) accepts the transcript (a, c, z) w.r.t. CRS ω′ =
(ω, k) and statement x if V(ω, x, a, c, z) = 1 and hk(a||x) = c (resp. hk(a) =
c).
Theorem 1. Suppose that H is a hash family that is correlationintractable for
all sub-exponentially sparse relations that are searchable in time t, and that
H enjoys programmability. Moreover, assume that Σ = (Gen,P,V,TrapGen,
BadChallenge) is a trapdoor Sigma protocol with SHVZK and challenge (second
message) space {0, 1}λε for some ε > 0, such that BadChallenge(τ, ω, x, a) is
computable in time t. Then, the non-interactive argument system Π ′ described
above satisfies zero-knowledge and adaptive soundness in the CRS model.
Theorem 2. Suppose that H is a hash family that is correlationintractable for
all sub-exponentially sparse relations that are searchable in time t, and that
H enjoys programmability. Moreover, assume that Σ = (Gen,P,V,TrapGen,
BadChallenge) is a trapdoor Sigma protocol with adaptive-input SHVZK18 and
challenge space {0, 1}λε for some ε > 0, such that BadChallenge(τ, ω, x, a) is
computable in time t. Then, the non-interactive argument system Π ′′ described
above satisfies soundness and adaptive zero knowledge in the CRS model.
We refer to the full version for the proofs of the theorems 1 and 2
From CRSigma Protocols to Trapdoor Sigma Protocols. In [14], the
authors show that a modified version of the protocol for Hamiltonian graphs
[31, 43] is a trapdoor Sigma protocol. This allows to obtain a trapdoor Sigma
protocol for any NP relation R by just making an NP reduction. In this section
we show that any CRSigma protocol can be turned into a trapdoor Sigma pro-
tocol without making use of expensive NP reductions. Let Σ = (Gen,P,V) be a
CRSigma protocol for a polynomial-time relation R. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the challenge space of Σ is {0, 1}. We construct a trapdoor Sigma
protocol Σ′ := (Gen′,P ′,V ′) for R based on Σ and on a public-key encryption
(PKE) scheme (KGen,Enc,Dec) with perfect correctness. The PKE scheme is
essentially used as a commitment, similarly to what is done in [14]. At a high
level our transform works as follows. The CRS consists of a public key for the
PKE scheme and of a CRS for Σ. To compute a proof, the prover generates
the first message of Σ and the replies to the challenge 0 and 1 that we denote
respectively with z0 and z1. Then, the prover encrypts z0 and z1 and sends these
encrypted values together with the first round of Σ to the verifier. The veri-
fier sends a random bit c, and the prover replies with zc and the randomness
17 Equivalently, the prover can just output (a, z) as c can be re-computed by the verifier.
18 As in the definition of adaptive-input SHVZK, the simulator is defined by two al-
gorithms (S0,S1). The difference is that S0 outputs the CRS in addition.
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used to compute the encryption of zc. Finally, the verifier accepts if the random-
ness and the value zc are consistent with the commitment received in the first
round and if the transcript for Σ is accepting. We note that given the secret
key of the encryption scheme it is possible to extract the bad challenge (if any).
And this is the intuitive reason why our protocol is a trapdoor Sigma protocol.
We refer to the full version for the formal description of the protocol and the
proof. We remark that it is always possible to extend the challenge space of the
above protocol to {0, 1}κ for any κ ∈ N without compromising its completeness,
by just repeating it in parallel κ times. Then, using Theorem 1, we obtain an
adaptively-sound NIZK.
Adding Adaptive-Input SHVZK. To transform a delayed-input trapdoor
Sigma protocol Σ = (Gen,P,V) into one with adaptive-input SHVZK Σ′′ we
follow the same approach proposed in §3. The prover computes the first round
ofΣ and commits to it using an IDTC that enjoys a special form of extractability.
We refer the reader to the full version for the formal definition of extractable
IDTCs, its concrete instantiation based on the DDH assumption, and for the
formal description of Σ′′ with its security analysis.
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2. Asharov, G., Jain, A., López-Alt, A., Tromer, E., Vaikuntanathan, V., Wichs,
D.: Multiparty computation with low communication, computation and inter-
action via threshold FHE. In: Pointcheval, D., Johansson, T. (eds.) EURO-
CRYPT 2012. LNCS, vol. 7237, pp. 483–501. Springer, Heidelberg (Apr 2012).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4˙29
3. Badrinarayanan, S., Goyal, V., Jain, A., Kalai, Y.T., Khurana, D., Sahai, A.:
Promise zero knowledge and its applications to round optimal MPC. In: Shacham,
H., Boldyreva, A. (eds.) CRYPTO 2018, Part II. LNCS, vol. 10992, pp. 459–487.
Springer, Heidelberg (Aug 2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96881-0˙16
4. Barak, B.: How to go beyond the black-box simulation barrier. In:
42nd FOCS. pp. 106–115. IEEE Computer Society Press (Oct 2001). ht-
tps://doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.2001.959885
5. Barak, B., Lindell, Y., Vadhan, S.P.: Lower bounds for non-black-box zero know-
ledge. In: 44th FOCS. pp. 384–393. IEEE Computer Society Press (Oct 2003).
https://doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.2003.1238212
6. Bellare, M., Goldreich, O.: On defining proofs of knowledge. In: Brickell, E.F.
(ed.) CRYPTO’92. LNCS, vol. 740, pp. 390–420. Springer, Heidelberg (Aug 1993).
https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48071-4˙28
7. Bellare, M., Ristov, T.: A characterization of chameleon hash functions and
new, efficient designs. Journal of Cryptology 27(4), 799–823 (Oct 2014).
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-013-9155-8
18 M. Ciampi et al.
8. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for design-
ing efficient protocols. In: Denning, D.E., Pyle, R., Ganesan, R., Sandhu,
R.S., Ashby, V. (eds.) ACM CCS 93. pp. 62–73. ACM Press (Nov 1993). ht-
tps://doi.org/10.1145/168588.168596
9. Bernhard, D., Pereira, O., Warinschi, B.: How not to prove yourself: Pitfalls of
the Fiat-Shamir heuristic and applications to Helios. In: Wang, X., Sako, K. (eds.)
ASIACRYPT 2012. LNCS, vol. 7658, pp. 626–643. Springer, Heidelberg (Dec 2012).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4˙38
10. Bitansky, N., Dachman-Soled, D., Garg, S., Jain, A., Kalai, Y.T., López-Alt,
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